PRO TEM
RECUSAL MINUTE ENTRY
By Judge Pro Tem Marc Victor
A justice system is a necessary prerequisite to any
civilized community of persons. For any justice system to be effective and
just, the judges who work in such a system must possess a strong sense of
justice.
Only human beings have the capacity to possess a
strong sense of justice. An inflexible, rigid and mechanical approach to
judging is not appropriate and has throughout history caused tremendous
injustice. As such, an honorable judge must frequently consult his or her
individual sense of justice.
A judge is obligated to faithfully follow and apply
the law. However, cases may arise where the applicable law is irreconcilably
at odds with a judge's strong sense of justice. In such a case, the judge is
thrust into a moral dilemma. The judge is faced with either applying a law
that is contrary to his or her strong sense of justice or failing to
faithfully apply the law. This case presents such a moral dilemma for this
judge pro tem.
A judge who applies a law which is contrary to his
or her strong sense of justice betrays not only the trust of those in the
courtroom but also the honor of the judicial office. This judge pro tem will
not act in contradiction to his strong sense of justice. Additionally, a
judge who will not faithfully apply the law cannot preside over a matter in
which that law is applicable. Therefore, recusal is the only option.
However, a recusal without explanation would deprive
any interested party of the reasons underpinning the moral dilemma faced by
this judge pro tem and would wrongly enshrine this court in a cloud of
mystery and secrecy. Free people are entitled to know and evaluate the
motivations, explanations and reasons underpinning a judge's actions.
The Non-Initiation of Force Principle
This judge pro tem will not use the power of the
state to initiate force against persons who have not trespassed or used
unlawful force or fraud against others or their property. This judge pro tem
has deeply held personal views which are in direct contradiction to the
duties of a judge who presides over non-violent drug cases. The two
positions cannot be reconciled.
This judge pro tem is unaware of Arizona judges
recusing themselves for similar reasons. However, there is evidence to
believe that some Arizona judges have grave concerns about Arizona's ongoing
war on drugs. See, Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 Ariz. L.
Rev. 135 (2001).
Additionally, at least one federal judge, the
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court in New York
has refused to try minor drug cases.
The list of learned judges across this nation who
have publicly objected to the war on drugs is substantial and includes:
1. Hon. Juan R. Torruella -- U.S. Court of Appeals,
First Circuit;
2. Hon. Myron Bright -- U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit; See, 61 F.3d at 1363.
3. Hon. Donald P. Lay - U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit;
4. Hon. Richard Posner -- U.S. Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit;
5. Hon. George Pratt - U.S. Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit;
6. Hon. Robert W. Pratt -- U.S. Southern District of
Iowa;
7. Hon. Nancy Gertner -- U.S. District Court,
Boston;
8. Hon. John L. Kane Jr. -- U.S. District Court,
Denver;
9. Hon. Stanley Sporkin -- U.S. District Court,
D.C.;
10.Hon. Whitman Knapp - U.S. District Court, New
York;
11.Hon. Robert Sweet - U.S. District Court, New
York;
12.Hon. Vaughn Walker - U.S. District Court, San
Francisco;
13.Hon. John T. Curtin -- U.S. District Court, New
York;
14.Hon. Warren Eginton - U.S. District Court,
Connecticut;
15.Hon. James C. Paine - U.S. District Court,
Florida;
16.Hon. James Gray -- Superior Court, Santa Ana, CA;
17.Hon. Peter Nimkoff -- Former U.S. Magistrate,
Miami; and
18.Hon. Volney V. Brown Jr. -- U.S. Magistrate, Los
Angeles.
Many abbreviated statements of the preceding judges,
can be reviewed online at
http://www.november.org/dissentingopinions/dissentingopinions.html and
http://www.ndsn.org/julaug98/courts5.html
The well reasoned views of the honorable judges
cited above in addition to the concurring opinions of people such as Nobel
Prize winning economist Milton Friedman weigh heavily upon the conscience of
this judge pro tem. This judge pro tem will not participate in administering
laws which, for so many reasons, wreak havoc on our society and conflict
with the moral conscience of this judge pro tem.
Although the above rationale may not mandate recusal,
no such legal mandate is required for recusal. The Arizona Supreme Court has
long held, " [A] judge may on his own motion, if he acts timely, recuse
himself even though the reason given might not be sufficient to form the
basis of a legal disqualification." Zuniga v. Superior Court, 77 Ariz. 222,
269 P.2d 720 (1954). See also, State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261
(1962).
Although the deeply held personal views of this
judge pro tem is a sufficient reason to warrant recusal in this case, it is
not the sole reason for recusal.
The Arizona Constitution
There can be no doubt that the Arizona Constitution
was instituted as an attempt to protect and maintain un-enumerated rights
which individuals possess independent of government. Indeed, the Arizona
Constitution specifically states, "All political power is inherent in the
people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.
Ariz. Const. Art. II."
Further, so there could be no misunderstanding, the
drafters of the Arizona Constitution explicitly stated, "The enumeration in
this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others
retained by the people. Ariz. Const. Art. II."
For a free society to remain free, a frequent
revisiting of the fundamental principles of freedom must never be relegated
to a mere academic discussion. The framers of the Arizona Constitution
understood the importance of a frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles. Such mandate was enshrined in the Arizona Constitution and is
important enough to be restated here:
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government. Ariz. Const. Art. II.
Based on the Arizona Constitution, there can be no
doubt that individuals have rights which exist independent of government and
that such rights exist despite not being enumerated in the Arizona
Constitution.
Among such un-enumerated rights must necessarily
exist the fundamental and basic right of each adult to control his or her
own body. It is difficult to conceive of or envision any right more central
and essential to a free society than the right to control one's own body.
The right to control one's own body must necessarily encompass the right to
control what foods, medications and other substances are introduced into the
body.
In interpreting the Arizona Constitution, the
Arizona Supreme Court has previously recognized the liberty right of an
individual to refuse the ingestion of unwanted chemical substances. See,
Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399 (1986). Such a
pronouncement is merely an illustration of the more fundamental and basic
right to control one's own body. Consistent with this constitutional right
to refuse ingestion is the reciprocal right to voluntarily ingest chemical
substances into one's own body.
Considering that the human body is entirely composed
from items which are ingested, the fundamental right to control one's own
body would be rendered meaningless without the right to control what is
ingested.
Furthermore, a constitutional right to ingest a
substance into one's own body necessarily implies a related right to
manufacture, transport, sell, purchase or possess such a substance or
ancillary items. Therefore, this judge pro tem cannot reconcile the current
drug prohibition laws with the constitutional right to control one's own
body. The drug prohibition laws appear to this judge pro tem to be in
violation of several provisions of the Arizona Constitution including Ariz.
Const. Art. II.
As with virtually all other rights, the right to
control one's own body is not absolute. However, the current drug
prohibition laws deprive all citizens of rights without any finding of prior
criminal conduct or other circumstances justifying a restriction or
deprivation of such a fundamental right.
This judge pro tem is bound to faithfully support
the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const. Art. II. However, this judge pro tem
acknowledges that the Arizona Supreme Court has previously determined that
possession of marijuana in a person's own home is not a basic constitutional
right. See, State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 570 P.2d 1070 (1977). As such,
there can be no doubt that the Arizona Supreme Court and this judge pro tem
disagree about the meaning of the Arizona Constitution. As a Superior Court
Judge Pro Tem, it would be wholly inappropriate to enter an order in direct
contradiction to the Arizona Supreme Court's clear precedent. Therefore,
recusal is the only appropriate course of action.
The United States Constitution
Similarly to the Arizona Constitution, the United
States Constitution also contemplates that people have rights independent of
government which they retain despite the fact that such rights are not
enumerated in the constitution itself. See, U.S. Const. Amends. IX, X.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has previously identified particular
fundamental constitutional rights which are not enumerated. See, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
93 S.Ct. 705 (1973).
This judge pro tem concludes that, based on the same
reasoning as applied to the Arizona Constitution above, there exists a
fundamental constitutional right to control one's own body which is
protected by the United States Constitution and is applicable to the State
of Arizona via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Although this
judge pro tem is not aware of any binding decisions which have recognized
the existence of such a federally protected right, this judge pro tem is
equally unaware of binding decisions specifically finding that no such right
exists.
However, more particularly relevant to this case is
the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court has found that no violation of a
defendant's federal constitutional rights occurs when the state criminalizes
the mere possession of marijuana in one's own home. State v. Murphy, 117
Ariz. 57, 570 P.2d 1070 (1977). Additionally, the United States Supreme
Court specifically recognized the power of state governments to make
possession of narcotics a crime. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct.
1243 (1969). That being the case, it would be wholly inappropriate for this
judge pro tem to enter an order which contradicts in any way the precedence
established by either the Arizona Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court. Therefore, recusal is the only appropriate course of action.
NORML
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to
disqualify himself or herself when the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 81, Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3 E
(1). The mandates involving recusal in the Code of Judicial Conduct apply
with equal force to part time judges pro tem. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 81, Code of
Jud.Conduct, Application D.
This judge pro tem is currently a member of the
legal committee for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws ("NORML.") This organization has as its policy statement the following:
NORML supports the right of adults to use
marijuana responsibly, whether for medical or personal purposes. All
penalties, both civil and criminal, should be eliminated for responsible
use. Further, to eliminate the crime, corruption and violence associated
with any "black market," a legally regulated market should be established
where consumers could buy marijuana in a safe and secure environment.
As a member of the NORML legal committee, this judge
pro tem believes that in a matter such as the one at hand, the impartiality
of this judge pro tem might reasonably be questioned. As such, recusal is
required.
Therefore, for all the reasons detailed in this
minute entry, this judge pro tem recuses himself.